Anti-monopoly law regulation path of algorithmic price discrimination
Wang Juxing, Li Han
(School of Law, University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100083, China)
Abstract： In the face of the possible negative effects of algorithmic price discrimination, we can put forward targeted regulatory paths through typological analysis. According to whether the operator abuses the pricing algorithm, it can be divided into rational algorithm price discrimination and monopolistic algorithm price discrimination, of which the latter has a certain negative effect and it is necessary to regulate it. According to the number of subjects who implement monopolistic algorithm price discrimination, it can be subdivided into single monopolistic algorithm price discrimination and collusion monopolistic algorithm price discrimination. The former′s regulatory dilemma mainly lies in the determination of the operator′s "market dominance", for which the operator′s data advantage can be taken as an important basis for inferring its market dominance; The regulatory dilemma of the latter mainly lies in the identification of competitors′ "agreement", which can be solved by "se rule" or "reasonable presumption principle". In addition, there is no agreement between competitors in autonomous algorithms, and they can only be regulated through the regulation path of "abusing market dominance".
Key words : digital economy; pricing algorithm; price discrimination; market dominance; algorithm collusion
